what tactic did scipio use to defeat hannibal

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Commander Kenneth T. "Max" Klima, USN, is Deputy Managing director for Intelligence, Articulation Staff J2. Lieutenant Colonel Peter Mazzella, USA, is the Joint Training System and Lessons Learned Branch Chief for Northward American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) J7. Major Patrick B. McLaughlin, USAF, is the Atomic number 82 Joint Planner for the Aerospace and Homeland Defense Plans Branch, NORAD and USNORTHCOM J5.

Bellum parate, quoniam pacem pati non potuistis.
[Prepare for state of war, since you take been unable to endure the peace.]

—Scipio Africanus to Hannibal, prior to the Boxing of Zama, in 202 BCE

Publius Cornelius Scipio (236–183 BCE), known more widely past the nom de guerre Scipio Africanus, was a Roman statesman and full general whose actions during the Second Punic War (218–201 BCE) demonstrate the eternal qualities embodied by modern concepts of articulation warfare. Scipio employed said concepts at all levels of war and showed an atypical ability to integrate armed services and political objectives into a single system. Although the period of antiquity was a time when the concepts of strategy were but nascent, the study of Scipio highlights practically every attribute of modern joint planning and operations. In analyzing Scipio, Basil H. Liddell Hart proposed that his "[m]ilitary work has a greater value to modern students of war than that of any other bully captain of the past."1 In fact, despite warfare's advancements in engineering and industry, Hart's observation of Scipio is as applicable to today's joint planner every bit it was nearly a century agone.

Scipio Africanus'south European and African campaigns during the Second Punic War serve every bit timeless lessons for joint forcefulness planners on how to bear center of gravity (COG) assay in back up of theater and national military planning. The campaigns are a superb vehicle with which to examine 5 fundamental lessons associated with today'southward concept of COG analysis:

• achieving the desired endstate
• COGs as part of a organization
• the indirect approach to attacking COGs
• how to motility between direct and indirect approaches
• the upshot of poor COG analysis.

Despite the use of 2,200-yr-old bear witness, all 5 lessons demonstrate how the basic dictums of modern doctrine proved pivotal in determining whether Rome or Carthage would rule the Mediterranean for near 6 centuries. Nevertheless, before we can use Scipio's campaign history to support our claims of COG assay, we must outset empathise the history and operational weather present during the 2nd Punic War.

The Operational Environment

Every bit the name suggests, the Second Punic War was not the beginning skirmish between Rome and Carthage. The First Punic State of war (264–241 BCE) was a disharmonize over the control of Sicily that ended inconclusively. In the interregnum between the kickoff and second conflict, an unsteady peace existed as each side maneuvered for advantage.

Circa 218 BCE, Carthaginian general Hannibal Barca prepared for, and so renewed, Carthage'southward efforts to subjugate its rival. Reportedly, he inherited his male parent's hatred of Rome and, through a cult of personality, led his army from the deserts of Africa, beyond the Mediterranean, over the Alps, and into the Italian peninsula, embarking on a bloody entrada to defeat Rome.2 In victory after victory, using the "mental and material means for a stroke at the heart of the Roman power," Hannibal'south tactical and operational genius crushed Rome's armies and established him as one of history'south greatest commanders.3 Post-obit Hannibal'southward decisive defeat of the Roman forces at Cannae (216 BCE), Carthage gained control of the Italian coast of Magna Graecia, which resulted in multiple Roman allies and economic vassals switching allegiances to Hannibal.iv Mail-Cannae, Hannibal was unable to lay siege to Rome to force its surrender. Instead, he launched a decades-long campaign throughout Italy during which, despite unending tactical success, he remained unable to achieve his military or political endstates: the subjugation of Rome.

The Battle Between Scipio and Hannibal at Zama, Cornelis Cort, afterwards Giulio Romano, engraving ca. 1550–1578, Elisha Whittelsey Collection (Courtesy Metropolitan Museum of Art)

Hannibal's tactical success did event in a shortage of qualified Roman generals willing to march out and see him. In agony, the Roman Senate eventually turned to an unproven 24-year-sometime Scipio—son of Publius Scipio, the full general defeated and slain by Carthaginian forces in 211 BCE—to remove the threat of Hannibal'southward forces from Rome'south doorstep. Yet, Scipio did non movement to straight challenge Hannibal in boxing, as was expected by about Roman leaders, but instead chose to have an indirect approach, deploying forces to Spain to carry a multiyear campaign against Carthaginian forces and allies.5 In Kingdom of spain, Scipio isolated and defeated four armies (including two led by Hannibal'due south brothers, Hasdrubal and Mago), destroyed lines of communication supporting Hannibal in Italy, and rebalanced Carthaginian allies back to Rome. Furthermore, Scipio showed a unique ability to carry articulation warfare, leveraging the unique attributes associated with the different units of the Roman ground forces, navy, and marine forces. Scipio's demonstrated ability to leverage strategic, operational, and tactical flexibility yielded extraordinary success.

Consequently, the victory in Kingdom of spain solidified the efficacy of Scipio'southward unorthodox arroyo, the Senate expanded his commission, and he moved his armies toward Africa to threaten the city of Carthage directly. The confluence of these events compelled Hannibal to abandon Italian republic and return to Africa, where his ground forces was met and routed past Scipio's forces at the Boxing of Zama (202 BCE). Hannibal'due south defeat finalized Carthage's defeat, securing for Rome a Mediterranean empire that would last almost 600 years.

Lesson 1: COG Analysis Enables Desired Endstates

The failure to understand the desired political endstate—what comes afterwards the transition to civil authorities—invariably leads to challenges in war termination and the establishment of legitimate governments, institutions, and authorities in postconflict states.six This challenge of overcoming the divide between military and political planning is non a phenomenon of the present age. Even a cursory study of Scipio expresses how the soldier-statesman must conduct a range of armed forces operations within a spectrum that simultaneously integrates all 3 levels of war while still supporting the desired political endstate (oftentimes referred to equally "national strategic endstate" in articulation doctrine). For example, during the Second Punic War, the political endstate was not solely the devastation of the adversary's war machine, only rather the military means to reach the political aim of securing unrivaled control of the Mediterranean world.7 Throughout the state of war, Scipio'due south military actions and operational approach demonstrated an ability to straight link singular and multiple military deportment toward the achievement of both the desired military machine conditions also equally the desired political endstate. Scipio's every activeness, both on and off the battleground, focused on achieving a lasting postwar peace in which Rome directed the form of a subdued but integrated Carthage. This accent ignored the traditional military focus on devastation of armies, industry, and economical means and instead used military successes to gear up the political conditions for Carthage to comply with Roman will in its affairs.

Some other instance of Scipio'southward political foresight in the utilize of military machine means was demonstrated after his successful seizure of the Carthaginian Spanish colony of Cartagena (209 BCE). Rather than destroy Spain's Celtic-Iberian tribes who supported Carthage—the very same tribes whose revolt from Rome led to the decease of Scipio'south begetter—Scipio broke with tradition and congenital shut ties with former enemies. The solar day after his triumph in Cartagena, Scipio showed clemency and even mercy toward the indigenous tribes both publicly and through policy. The Roman historian Livy claims these acts actually endeared Scipio to the people throughout Espana and were major causes toward undercutting Carthage'southward political command in the region. Scipio'south deportment may take gone against the common military practice of the age, but his mercy shifted Spain's loyalty from Carthage to Rome—irrevocably destroying Carthage's supply of personnel and financial support for Hannibal'south Italian operations.

By remaining focused on the desired political endstate, Scipio adroitly avoided expected armed services practices that were counter to the postwar peace. Spain, a hotbed of insurgents and untrustworthy allies, was also the source of Carthaginian troop levies, food supplies, and state of war economics essential to Hannibal's Italian campaign. In addition to his military victories, Scipio'due south chivalrous handling of former foes had a compounding effect in that other tribes and nations loyal to Carthage surrendered to Roman forces rather than battle Scipio or remain Carthaginian vassals.8 Consequently, in a few masterful strokes, Scipio won a regular state of war, ended an irregular war, destroyed Hannibal's supply chain, and integrated the Spanish tribes into the greater Roman political and economic system in the Mediterranean. Scipio remarked to the Roman Senate that in Spain he had faced down four enemy commanders and four armies, with the outcome being not a single Punic soldier remaining in Kingdom of spain.9 Focusing on both military and political endstates, Scipio's actions effectively neutralized the troublesome tribes of Spain from supporting Carthage for the remainder of the Punic Wars.x

Scipio followed the aforementioned formula after his initial victories post-obit the invasion of Africa (206–204 BCE). Hannibal remained in Italy, but Carthaginian political elites, fearing Scipio's invasion forcefulness, felt defenseless and sued for peace. The resulting peace terms were lenient for the age and indicate Scipio's preference to integrate Carthage and its colonies into the Roman arrangement as contributing partners. The peace lasted until Hannibal returned to Africa to challenge Scipio directly. Nevertheless, after Hannibal's defeat at Zama and in spite of the Carthaginian Senate's deceit, Scipio's demands for a final peace remained principally the same as those agreed upon prior to Hannibal's return. Livy's record shows this movement was not popular in Rome, equally some leaders wanted Carthage to endure in defeat—much similar Deutschland would exist made to endure by the victors after Earth War I. Scipio'south leniency toward his defeated enemy indicates he believed a weakened Carthage with a destroyed army and frail institutions would take created a peace no different from that post-obit the First Punic War—sowing the seeds for yet another war between the two empires.11

Scipio's ability to place the desired political endstate allowed each tactical and operational move to accelerate toward achieving "a more perfect peace." The result was that every action, pocket-size or large, was integrated into the overall operational objective of removing Hannibal from Italia and subjugating Carthage. In doing and then, Scipio successfully subjugated the enemy while sustaining the smallest possible cost of life and resources.12 Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Functioning Planning, echoes Scipio'due south approach, identifying the need for "a clear understanding of the terminate state and the atmospheric condition that must exist to end military operations. Knowing when to terminate military operations and how to preserve accomplished advantages is cardinal to achieving the national strategic end state."thirteen

Scipio's success teaches joint planners that a disquisitional component of COG assay involves a greater understanding of the desired political endstate. A clearer agreement of the political conditions informs the COG word and furthers identification of the ways for destroying or disabling adversary COGs. Current doctrine focuses on military machine termination and phase-transition criteria and directs political endstates to be the province of political decisionmakers. JP v-0 describes the process and products that the National Command Authority uses to develop national strategy, only does not discuss how the regime develops desired political endstates for specific conflicts. Political entities and institutions do not necessarily take clear (in Department of Defense terms) mechanisms to create identifiable endstates to serve military planning objectives. JP v-0 does place the commander'due south need to work with interagency mechanisms, but these efforts are varied and reliant on the individuals in control and do not lead to clear integration of government institutions and the military.

In dissimilarity to Scipio, Hannibal exemplifies the pitfalls of not integrating desired military and political endstates. According to the Roman record, Hannibal'due south cavalry leader Maharbal remarked to his commander that Hannibal "knew how to gain a victory" just did "non know how to use it."14 Hannibal'southward arroyo is akin to Marker Cancian's 1998 discourse on the fallacy of COG assay, every bit they both incorrectly identify the goal of all military operations equally attaining a battlefield advantage.fifteen Hannibal'southward emphasis on battlefield reward resulted in a serial of tactical and operational successes that never led to strategic victory. Scipio's approach stands in stark dissimilarity and serves as a reminder to military machine planners that the transition to a better peace does not occur but considering 1 has accomplished the desired armed forces endstate.

Other conflicts more than contempo than the 2nd Punic War accept demonstrated both the difficulty today's joint planners face in outlining war termination criteria and the effective transition from military to ceremonious authorities and the importance in doing and then. This is more likely a result of military planners focusing principally on armed forces approaches to the transition from peace to war rather than integrating whole-of-authorities efforts focused on achieving the smooth transition from war back to peace. Carl von Clausewitz identified the ties between national politics and the aims of disharmonize, but it was General William T. Sherman who clarified that "[due west]ar'due south legitimate object is a more perfect peace." Historical examples provide evidence that responsibleness falls to the rare soldier-statesman to accept the greatest understanding of the national strategic ends: the transition betwixt politics-to-war-to-peace and and then once again to politics. This lesson may be the virtually profound for mod war machine planners who railroad train to create a specific military endstate and and then speak of transition.

Current doctrine teaches today's planners that military planning cannot exist effective without a clear understanding of the military endstate and that the termination of military operations is key to achieving the "national strategic end country."sixteen No single regime institution is responsible for defining an individual strategic endstate, peculiarly for major theater contingency plans, whereas the armed forces receives guidance directly from the National Command Dominance through a byzantine process of strategic guidance and the labyrinthine Articulation Strategic Planning System. Unfortunately, the articulation planner does not accept a role in developing responsibilities in the international arrangement of states, and the crafters of national strategy are not members of joint planning groups, resulting in a natural fissure between armed services and political ends. Mod planners therefore must learn from Scipio's case and create a working agreement of the political endstate rather than remain preoccupied solely on the defeat or destruction of the opposing militaries. Only with this agreement can military success effectively interpret to lasting stability and peace later on hostilities have ceased.

Lesson 2: COG and Its Elements Are Part of an Interconnected Organisation

Scipio'south 2nd lesson is to view COGs as role of an interconnected system in order to detect which pressure level points yield the maximum effect. There remain deep, integral relationships between the COGs at the varying levels of state of war that create an interconnected system identified through COG analysis. Therefore, the ability exists to use analytical results to focus armed forces operations to create arrangement-wide impacts. Agreement COGs as a system ways that even tactical actions can support strategic ends. Applying the mod rubrics of COG analysis to the Second Punic War, information technology becomes articulate that the integrated COG assay of Scipio indicated Hannibal'due south forces in Italy were not the strategic COG—the level about interconnected with the desired political endstate—but more than probable an operational COG.17 Moreover, this analysis indicates the defeat of Hannibal at the operational level of war would non have led to a strategic defeat of Carthage. Conversely, improper or incorrect analysis limits the ability to target or influence the whole, and effects are isolated rather than systemic—hence Scipio's decision to ignore the Senate'southward orders to face Hannibal straight and instead seek an indirect way of threatening the true strategic COG of Carthage itself.

Hannibal's reliance on Espana equally a disquisitional force enabler supporting his operational COG—Carthage's fielded forces in Italy—made it the logical target for Scipio's indirect strategy. In sacking the Spanish city of Cartagena, Scipio cut off Hannibal's lifeline and crippled his operational capability without ever having faced the dreaded general on the battlefield. Livy records Scipio instructing his forces, "You volition in actuality set on the walls of a single city, merely in that single urban center you volition accept made yourselves masters of Spain."eighteen Liddell Hart farther identified that the Castilian campaign was not merely about Spain, equally military actions at the operational level had systemic effects influencing the strategic:

Scipio, in whom the idea of strategic exploitation was every bit inborn as the tactical, was not content to remainder on his accolade. Already he was looking to the future, directing his view to Africa. Equally he had seen that Cartagena was the central to Kingdom of spain, that Kingdom of spain was the primal to the state of affairs in Italy, so he saw that Africa was the key to the whole struggle. Strike at Africa, and he would not only salve Italian republic of Hannibal's ever menacing presence—a menace which he had already reduced by paralyzing Hannibal's source of reinforcement—but would undermine the foundations of Carthaginian power, until the edifice itself collapsed in ruin.19

Scipio's indirect approach into Kingdom of spain provides planners a lesson in the effectiveness of thorough COG analysis. The military planner must non only understand the fact that COGs exist at multiple levels only likewise endeavor to understand how the connection between those COGs and their elements (critical capabilities [CCs], critical requirements [CRs], and critical vulnerabilities [CVs]) collaborate with one another.twenty While attacking a unmarried vulnerability, one may create a cascading effect that paralyzes or destroys the enemy's system from within—setting conditions for the desired endstate.

Scipio Africanus Storming New Carthage, ca. 1470, tempera on cloth, mounted on cassone panel, gift of Mr. and Mrs. Theodore W. Bennett (Courtesy Minneapolis Institute of Art)

Several examples from Scipio's Spanish campaign emphasize the importance of understanding systemic relationships of COGs. The lenient handling of the Spanish tribes—an operational CR for Hannibal'due south manpower needs, and those of Carthage at the strategic level—eventually led Spain to switch sides and support Rome'south futurity operations in Africa. So there is Scipio's leniency following his victory at Cartagena, which led to the defection of the Numidian leader and cavalry commander Masinissa from Hannibal to Scipio. Specifically, after learning 1 of the prisoners was the nephew of Masinissa, Scipio provided care for the youth and ensured his safety return domicile. This unmarried act attacked Carthage'south arrangement past affecting multiple CRs and CVs of Carthage and Hannibal, resulting in a systemic ripple effect that shaped the execution and outcome of the 2d Punic War. Through sparing the life of a pocket-size boy, an oddity of restraint in that age, a key Carthaginian ally in Africa became sympathetic to Rome, helping nullify Carthage's powerbase.21

As a final instance from the entrada in Espana, post-obit Scipio'due south victory at Cartagena, the Carthaginians split into three armies-in-being, with 2 commanded by Hannibal's brothers. Rather than staying on the defensive and enabling the Carthaginian armies to mass, Scipio moved from the siege warfare of Cartagena to operational maneuver and eliminated each of the Carthaginian armies in succession without assuasive them to combine. Skilful at using his new allies as intelligence networks, Scipio was able to maneuver his smaller force to bring larger enemies to battle where and when he chose.22 The results of his approach were 3 sequential battles, each characterized by innovative tactics and massive battlefield successes that remain instructive for modern tactical planners and commanders. More than important, Scipio's truthful mastery of warfare is axiomatic in how each individual action was part of a grand strategy to defeat Hannibal (operational COG) and Carthage (strategic COG). While Hannibal's tactical successes never placed pressure on Rome's COGs, Scipio's deportment attacked all levels of the Carthaginian system. Scipio's example demonstrates the value of understanding the systemic nature of COG, CCs, CRs, and CVs and approaching each step with calculated forethought, because the systemic impacts associated with the interconnected nature of war.23

Lesson Three: Using the Indirect Approach

Scipio's indirect strategy of defeating Hannibal and Carthage offers joint planners a third lesson—how to utilise an indirect approach to assail COGs. Regardless of the estimation of Clausewitz, the application of COG analysis theory often devolves into planning to attack an enemy where it is the strongest and falsely believing that when the identified forcefulness is defeated, the enemy'due south will to resist will crumble. The direct approach maintains that meeting enemy strength with friendly strength is the best use of force and leads to the greatest possible massing of armies. The estimation continues that COG is therefore the recipe for rapid and decisive victory. Those who decry COG analysis often lean on this misunderstanding as the major betoken of their assertions of the uselessness of the concept. The review of Scipio not only counters the fallacy of misunderstanding COG analysis but also emphasizes how the application of proper analysis can avoid resource-intensive, strength-on-force battles that frazzle militaries and national will but do not result in the culmination of strategic aims.

Although Scipio's senatorial commission specifically directed him to attack Hannibal in Italy, his initial force was as well small and inexperienced to have whatsoever hope of victory. These orders ignored the years of defeat suffered by Roman generals who could practise piffling more than than check Hannibal'due south accelerate through modest skirmishes and delaying tactics. With Hannibal's regular army being larger, more experienced, better armed, better resourced, and meliorate prepared, Scipio had no prospect of victory using a direct approach. It was clear to him that Kingdom of spain was the fundamental source of Hannibal's power to organize for state of war—a conversion point for levies and material and economic support.24 Liddell Hart comments, "By swiftness of move, superior tactics, and good diplomacy he converted this defensive object into an offensive, if indirect, thrust at Carthage and at Hannibal."25 Victory validated this arroyo; Scipio won Espana for Rome without facing Hannibal'south primary force, and by taking Espana he struck at the COG—Hannibal's ground forces.

Scipio would go on an indirect arroyo throughout the 2nd Punic War. Following victory in Kingdom of spain, he prepared to invade Africa with an army congenital on the Roman legions defeated by Hannibal at the Battle of Cannae. The Senate again ordered him to assail Hannibal in Italy. Roman Senator Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus (surnamed Cunctator), who had previously conducted a campaign to delay Hannibal's army, criticized Scipio's indirect approach: "Why do you not apply yourself to this, and acquit the state of war in a straight forrad way to the identify where Hannibal is, rather than pursue that roundabout course, co-ordinate to which you expect that when you lot accept crossed into Africa Hannibal volition follow you tither."26

Scipio countered his political opponents and once more sought to fight Hannibal indirectly by taking the war to Africa: "Provided no impediment is caused here [in the Senate], you volition hear at once that I have landed and that Africa is blazing with state of war; that Hannibal is preparing to depart from this land. . . . I shall . . . have the opponent you assign me, Hannibal, but I shall rather depict him later on me than be kept here by him."27

In the invasion of Africa, Scipio moves firmly from the operational to the strategic in his approach to implementing his COG analysis. His words and actions indicate an understanding of how the indirect approach provided the greatest systemic effects by threatening a strategic COG—in this case, the will of the political elites of Carthage to continue the war. With the primary body of the Carthaginian ground forces away, Scipio's combined/joint amphibious assault into Africa threatened "government change" in Carthage proper. Whereas Hannibal's regular army in Italy was necessary to defeat Rome, it was wholly irrelevant in the defence of Carthage with Scipio's army in Africa. The Carthaginian Senate ordered Hannibal to end his Italian campaign and render to Carthage'south defense. A masterstroke of strategic craftsmanship, Scipio'southward COG analysis drove Hannibal from Roman lands fifty-fifty though he had not lost a major battle.

The lesson from antiquity is articulate to articulation military planners—the adversary's ground forces should not be the focus of war machine strategy. The use of the indirect approach provides means to neutralize or defeat an enemy or enemy force without necessarily attacking strengths or, at times, even forces. There are no unlimited resources in war, and the force that can meliorate meet military and political ends through the efficient use of forcefulness has the reward. The indirect approach also offers the ability to create ameliorate postwar political conditions past controlling forcefulness and thus minimizing its collateral effects. Scipio'southward indirect approach is an example of how the adversary'southward integrated political and military organization can be analyzed to most effectively apply force in pursuit of statecraft. As the system becomes clearer, the means to collapse that organization also become clearer. Notably, the use of COG analysis toward an indirect arroyo aligns with modernistic maneuver doctrines among the land components, the evolution of airpower doctrine, and distributed lethality concepts in the maritime domain. It stands to reason that if proper analysis could assist avoid costly military overextension in conventional war, it would as well assist in identifying ameliorate means of applying military force in our current irregular wars. To plan for the future of combat, it appears the joint force must render to antiquity: Scipio's indirect approach to the use of force inside adversarial COGs could and should inform the evolution and execution of modern doctrine.

Lesson Four: Moving Between Indirect and Direct Approaches

Scipio's use of the indirect approach to set on COGs comes with a caveat. Should directly military action offer an opportunity for a debilitating accident, so long as it supports the COG analysis and the risk to ane'southward own strength is lower, one should have the opportunity and strike. In 205 BCE, while preparing to invade Africa, intelligence indicated the leaders of Locri favored Rome over Hannibal, their occupier. Scipio departed from his plan and launched a swift seaborne raid, the stupor of which caused the rapid evacuation of all Carthaginian forces at Locri. Hannibal quickly moved to counter simply found himself exposed to a trap laid past Scipio, who had combined operational deception with an expeditionary assault backside Hannibal'southward lines. Hannibal withdrew. The upshot of the motion from the indirect to directly approach was the addition of another Italian ally to Rome, the reduction of a Carthaginian ally, a moral victory for Scipio'south legions, and a moral defeat for Hannibal'southward regular army.28

Scipio's caveat to the indirect approach appears similar to Admiral Chester Nimitz'southward calculated take a chance order to his operational commander prior to the Boxing of Midway: "In carrying out the task assigned in Operation Program 29-42 you will be governed by the principle of calculated chance, which you shall interpret to mean the avoidance of exposure of your forcefulness to attack by superior enemy forces without good prospect of inflicting, as a result of such exposure, greater damage to the enemy."29 In the cases of Locri and Midway, the victory weakened a component of an identified COG. For Hannibal, it was the perception of the invincibility of the commander, whereas at Midway, it was the loss of four Japanese aircraft carriers. Scipio'due south and Nimitiz'due south approaches to transition from the indirect to the direct arroyo prove the power of measured boldness and of how the operational bear on of switching to the direct approach at a time and place of their choosing was fundamentally supported by the previous employ of the indirect approach. Each had at his disposal all the personnel and resources to take reward of the state of affairs. Nimitz had three carriers and disquisitional intelligence, whereas Scipio had trained and experienced legions, significant sealift, and intelligence from disaffected allies.

After Locri, Scipio principally returned to the indirect arroyo. He maneuvered once Hannibal was in Africa, taking no direct action until drawing Hannibal abroad from his lines of communication and ensuring he was located in territory advantageous to the Roman force. Only at Zama did Scipio render to the direct approach, attacking the operational COG: Hannibal'south forces.

Scipio's excellence in generalship was not simply in the utilize of the indirect approach over the straight but besides in his power to switch and know when to switch betwixt the two. A deep agreement of the environment and the enemy must exist to have this level of battlefield cognizance, and such understanding is an element of planning developed during COG analysis. Current doctrine, such as JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, discusses how one should conduct COG analysis but does non cover the flexible use of the theory and how COG analysis can provide a level of understanding that allows commanders to seize the initiative and convert from the indirect to the direct approach.30 Expansion of our current doctrine can provide commanders a far greater level of understanding through which forcefulness mayhap applied.

Lesson Five: The Result of Poor COG Analysis

Lessons from the Second Punic War include the event of negligent or nonexistent COG analysis of the enemy. Polybius, the Hellenistic historian who is the closest primary source of the Punic Wars, noted, "Those who have won victories are far more numerous than those who take used them to their reward."31 In the Second Punic War, the absence of the elements of COG analysis by Hannibal was at minimum a contributing factor to Carthage'south ultimate defeat.

Hannibal's strategy against Rome focused on defeating armies and subjugating allies. Historical hindsight indicates this was an incorrect analysis considering Rome's power came from the institutions that bound its Senate and its people. This analysis of Rome's COG is strengthened by the fact that repeated military machine defeats were never able to sway Rome from its strategic goals. Furthermore, the Roman Senate appeared to understand to some extent its ain COG in that information technology weighed each of Hannibal's military moves in relation to his ability to have Rome. This Roman view is similar to Clausewitz'southward didactics to consider "the dominant characteristics of both belligerents,"32 as well as Sun Tzu'due south duality that victory requires understanding the adversary and self.33 Hannibal would threaten the urban center of Rome—the source of political will and the Roman Empire's strategic COG—only once. Following his triumphant victory at Cannae, Hannibal moved to attack the heavy defense of Rome just was unable to secure victory due to a lack of siege machines and enablers for urban gainsay. Hannibal's lack of COG analysis and its resulting impact on operations amplified his failure to change or change his operational approach.34 Despite years of campaigning, Hannibal never congenital the siege weapons or combat arms necessary to strike at the heart of his enemy—Rome itself. Consequently, despite his invincibility on the battleground, Hannibal could not win the war.

A 2d example of poor COG analysis comes from Carthage's failure to cheque Scipio'due south ability to maneuver throughout the Mediterranean, particularly using sealift. In the First Punic War, Carthage held a numerical and technological border in maritime warfare, forcing Rome to execute a massive shipbuilding program. Rome used innovative techniques and new technology to turn the Mediterranean into a contested maritime surround, winning vi of vii major naval battles and setting the weather for an unsteady peace. Both states maintained a sizable naval capability through the Second Punic War, with each heavily relying on sealift for the movement of forces. Scipio, for instance, used a fleet of 50 warships and 400 transports to transfer his forces to Spain. Carthage maintained a large maritime force in the war and was able to move whole armies—first the army of Hannibal'southward blood brother, Mago, from Gaul to Africa, and then Hannibal himself from Italy to Carthage—during its grade. Proper COG analysis would take indicated sealift as a CR of Scipio's force, and Carthage would have had the ability to attack information technology with good prospects of battling the sea lines. In this try, Carthage would not take needed to defeat Roman navies, which they appeared to lack the aptitude to exercise, only to challenge Rome's ability to use the bounding main lines and in and so doing complicate or disrupt the ability of Scipio's forces to motion past ocean.

Nonetheless the Carthaginian strategic failure to appreciate the nature of battling the maritime domain is evident in 1 of the most referenced elements of the Second Punic War: Hannibal'south overland movement of his army from Spain to Italy. The feat is often heralded as masterful, but Hannibal in fact lost one-half of his elephants and half of his army along the route. Alfred Thayer Mahan pondered Carthage's refusal to check Rome'due south navy past because "how unlike things might have been could Hannibal take invaded Italy by body of water, every bit the Romans often had Africa."35 Rome, conversely, remained concerned with Carthage's ability to use sea power throughout the war. Following Scipio's Spanish victories (207 BCE), he was ordered to yield a large chemical element of his navy to the military governor of Sicily because intelligence indicated the threat of Carthaginian maritime forces blockading the Italian coast.36 Throughout the course of the state of war, Rome kept multiple fleets to protect its territorial waters from Punic raids, secure vital sea lines of advice, and stave off a 2d-front war engineered by Carthage with Macedon—all indicating that Rome continued to view Carthaginian maritime forces as a fundamental threat. Minimal Carthaginian efforts to interdict or destroy communications, envoys, or supplies would have created detrimental systemic effects across Scipio'due south strength, at a minimum delaying his timelines and perchance preventing his ultimate invasion of Africa. Carthage had the forces to practice so, equally became apparent in the final treaty of the war wherein Scipio ordered the entire navy of Carthage destroyed save for 10 ships to allow the city to defend its commerce from piracy.37

Whereas COG is not necessarily the pathway to victory, its "true value . . . may be the framework the concept provides for thinking about war. In other words, the process of determining centers of gravity may be every bit important every bit the production."38 Moreover, poor analysis that reinforces biases or prejudices and fails to implement a thorough approach nigh certainly leads to defeat. The example of Scipio shows how understanding the operational environs enables the commander to make sense from chaos when complex military challenges are analyzed and viewed systemically.

Conclusion

Statuary bosom of Scipio Africanus in Naples National Archaeological Museum, dated mid-1^st century BCE, from Villa of Papyri in Herculaneum, modern Ercolano, Italia (Courtesy Miguel Hermoso Cuesta)

The campaigns of Scipio Africanus provide an ancient example of the application of the modern doctrine of center of gravity. COG analysis is not a new concept, and the universality exposed in an example from 2,200 years ago underscores the vital linkages betwixt today'south modern doctrine and the wars of antiquity. While COG assay is a doctrinal process, its value in awarding is direct proportional to the skill of its use. Using this assay to entrench preconceived notions most strength-on-force battle or to support an private's views related to the dictums of strategic science, is a misapplication that is every bit detrimental to the desired armed forces and political endstates as battlefield defeat. Proper COG analysis through all levels of war, including the pursuit of "a more perfect peace," assists the military planner in constructing armed forces means of supporting an integrated approach to the culmination of the desired political endstate. COG analysis enables the planner to ameliorate recollect about what goal is trying to exist achieved (ends) and how it is to be accomplished (means).39 A well-executed COG analysis allows one to conceptualize which parts of one's ain organisation the adversary may attempt to directly or indirectly target, giving the thoughtful planner greater insight into the opponent's intent.40

To find examples of the effective application of COG analysis, joint force planners can render to antiquity. During the Second Punic State of war, Scipio Africanus demonstrates multiple historical models that prove timeless and universal themes of war that be whenever sanctioned violence is employed in the pursuit of national security interests. Perhaps more than those of whatever other historic figure, Scipio's exploits provide the modernistic joint forcefulness anecdotal excellence in the awarding of modern armed forces theory—peculiarly in the realm of COG analysis and its apply in supporting combat forces. In studying the victories and defeats of history'south great captains, modern joint planners should use articulation doctrine every bit a prism to view and distill the genius and folly that resulted in victories and defeats. They should look upon the battles of antiquity as laboratories for honing doctrinal principles and crucial lessons in military acumen prior to employing them in the field. The lessons identified only scratch the surface of the applied application that exists within the study of Scipio. There still exists a wealth of intellectual treasure from generals and battles that have been "lost" due to a lack of familiarity among modern readers. Such is the case with Scipio Africanus, arguably history's greatest general, wherein many studies have focused not on his victories, just on the failures of the general he defeated. JFQ

Notes

1 Basil Henry Liddell Hart, Scipio Africanus: Greater Than Napoleon (Boston: Little, Brown, 1927), vi.

2 Ibid., 20–21. Hart provides commentary on the emotional and moral aspects of Hannibal's Italian campaign: "During the long interval of outward peace this Carthaginian Bismarck prepared the mental and cloth means for a stroke at the heart of the Roman power, educating his sons and followers to conceive the conquest of Rome as their goal, and using Spain every bit the preparation ground for the Barcinse schoolhouse of war, as well equally the base of operations of their forthcoming military effort. In 218 B.C., Hannibal, crossing the Alps, began his invasion of Italy to reap the harvest for which his father had sown the seeds."

3 Ibid., 21.

4 Polybius, The Histories of Polybius, vol. 1, trans. Evelyn S. Shuckburgh from the text of F. Hultsch (London: Macmillan, 1889), book 3, chapter 118.

5 For the purposes of this article, modern geographical boundaries will be used except where doing and then would complicate the narrative. Spain refers non to the political entity but to the Iberian Peninsula, and Italy to the Italian Peninsula.

half-dozen Joint Publication (JP) v-0, Joint Operational Planning (Washington, DC: The Articulation Staff, 2011), III-44.

7 Basil Henry Liddell Hart, Strategy (New York: Top, 1991), 55. "The entrada of Zama (the culminating battle) fabricated Rome the dominant power in the Mediterranean world."

eight Hart, Scipio Africanus, 83.

ix Robert L. O'Connell, The Ghosts of Cannae: Hannibal and the Darkest Hour of the Roman Republic (New York: Random Firm, 2010), 223.

ten Hart, Scipio Africanus, 84.

11 Half a century later, for multiple reasons, there was a Third Punic War (149–146 BCE). It did not go well for Carthage, with the capital existence destroyed, all territory annexed, and the population killed or enslaved. Such ways would accept likely been seen by Scipio equally not supporting Rome's national security interests.

12 "The aim of a nation in state of war is, therefore, to subdue the enemy's will to resist with the least possible human and economic loss to itself." Basil Henry Liddell Hart, Thoughts on War (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1944).

13 JP 5-0, III-eighteen.

xiv Livy, The History of Rome, trans. Frank Gardener Moore (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949), book 22, chapter 51.

fifteen Marking Cancian, "Centers of Gravity Are a Myth," U.S. Naval Plant Proceedings 124, no. ix (September 1998), 5.

16 JP 5-0, Three-18.

17 Joseph Strange and Richard Iron, "Understanding Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities, Parts I and Ii," Air War College, available at <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/cog1.pdf> and <world wide web.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/cog1.pdf>.

eighteen Livy, volume 26, chapter 43.

xix Hart, Scipio Africanus, 63.

xx Strange and Iron.

21 Hart, Scipio Africanus, 86–87.

22 Although beyond the scope of this article, Scipio'south use of intelligence to support his operations and foresight is notable for antiquity likewise as the mod earth. His Spanish and African campaigns evidenced a use of intelligence that was unprecedented. Furthermore, it could be argued Scipio established the showtime J2 unit specifically for the collection and analysis of intelligence to support his military operations.

23 Hart, Scipio Africanus, 98.

24 Antulio J. Echevarria 2, Clausewitz'south Center of Gravity: Changing Our Warfighting Doctrine—Once again! (Carlisle Billet, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), 12.

25 Hart, Strategy, 49.

26 Livy, book 28, chapter 41.

27 Ibid., volume 28, affiliate 44.

28 Hart, Scipio Africanus, 109.

29 James Thousand. Stelle, "Running Estimate and Summary, CINCPAC Staff at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, Covering the Menstruum 7 Dec 1941 to 31 August 1942," in Control Summary of Armada Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, USN, vol. one, available at <www.usnwc.edu/Academics/Library/Naval-Historical–Drove.aspx#items/show/849>. Emphasis added.

30 JP two-03.1, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, June 2009), II-65–Two-67.

31 Polybius, vol. ii, book eleven, chapter 36.

32 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton Academy Press, 1976), 703.

33 "If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the issue of a hundred battles. If you lot know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If yous know neither the enemy nor yourself, yous will succumb in every battle." Sun Tzu, The Art of War: The New Translation, trans. J.H. Huang (New York: Harpers, 1993).

34 The Showtime Punic War provided ample grist for assay. Particularly Hannibal would accept been aware of the depth of Roman political will in warfare every bit evidenced by its construction of a navy when none of note had previously existed. Using a combination of public and private financing, Rome constructed and maintained a fleet of approximately 300 vessels for 26 years. Run into Michael Pitassi, The Roman Navy: Ships, Men, and Warfare 350 BC– AD 475 (South Yorkshire, U.k.: Seaforth Publishing, 2012).

35 Alfred Thayer Mahan, From Sheet to Steam: Recollections of Naval Life (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1906), 231.

36 Livy, volume 27, chapter 22.

37 Scipio's focus on the military machine and political endstate is as well shown in his keen awareness of Carthage'southward maritime tradition and capability in the devastation of the navy during a time when ships could accept easily been seized and added to 1'due south own force, all the more so since the Carthaginian and Roman warships were identically built. Seizure would have swelled, perhaps doubled, the size of the Roman navy, making it larger than Rome had the ability to manage. Such a large forcefulness, with its personnel spread over a larger number of hulls, would have been weaker in the naval battles of the 24-hour interval. Many of the largest would have likely been "decommissioned" or sold, making them available potentially to Rome's enemies. It is notable in these treaties that Scipio did not destroy the Carthaginian means for naval construction. This is likely due to the fact the shipyards of the day could be purposed for either commercial or military vessels. The lesson to Carthage's leaders was articulate: they could continue their maritime commerce, but not have a navy. Lastly, edifice a navy from 10 small vessels would have been a resource-heavy endeavour that a weakened Carthage, subservient to Rome, would be unable to undertake.

38 Milan Vego, Joint Operational Warfare (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2009), Vii-14.

39 Echevarria, 20.

xl Strong and Atomic number 26, 7.

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